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The generosity of public pensions may depress private savings and provide incentives to retire 
early. While there is plenty of evidence supporting the latter effect, there remains considerable 
controversy as whether or not public pensions crowd out private savings. This paper uses 
international micro-datasets collected over recent years to investigate whether public pensions 
displace private savings. The identification strategy relies on differences in the progressivity or 
non-linearity of pension formulas across countries. We also make use of large heterogeneity in 
earnings across education group and country. The evidence we present is consistent with 
previous studies using cross-sectional and time-series variation in savings and pensions. We 
estimate that an extra dollar of pension wealth depresses accumulated financial assets at the time 
of retirement by 23 to 44 cents and that an extra ten thousand dollars in pension wealth reduces 
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In his seminal article, Feldstein (1974) argues that the generosity of public pensions may 
affect the amount of private savings held at the time of retirement through two effects: a 
displacement effect due to the fact that a marginal increase in public benefits will lead to 
an increased consumption over the entire life-cycle, hence leading to lower private 
savings; or an early retirement effect due to the increase in lifetime income which may 
imply larger savings at the time of retirement to finance consumption through retirement. 
Hence, the effect is ambiguous. Furthermore, although the standard model predicts 
perfect displacement (one more dollar of pension assets reduces financial assets by one 
dollar), conditional on a given retirement age, this will generally not hold in more general 
models with borrowing constraints and uncertainty.  
 Feldstein (1974) uses aggregate time series data from the U.S. and reports 
displacement effect ranging from -30 cent to -50 cent per dollar of pension benefits 
depending on the specification.  Since then, a whole range of estimates has been reported 
using different identification strategies and measures of non-pension and pension assets. 
Estimates of the effect of pension wealth on non-pension wealth range from close to zero 
(Kotlikoff, 1979) to close to negative one (Gale, 1998). The bulk of those studies has 
been done on U.S. data but there is also international evidence exploiting pension reforms 
in several European countries. Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) find evidence of a 
displacement effect on savings rate following the 1992 pension reform in Italy. Similarly, 
Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) analyze pension reforms in the U.S. and also find 
evidence of a displacement effect. Kapteyn, Alessie and Lusardi (2005) find that cohort 
differences in accumulated wealth can in part be explained by differences in social 
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security wealth. Some studies have also exploited cross-country differences in assets. 
Feldstein (1979) uses aggregate data from 12 countries and finds a displacement effect of 
37 cents per dollar of pension benefits.  Kapteyn and Panis (2005) consider a case study 
using micro data from three countries (The U.S., the Netherlands and Italy) to show that 
in countries where public pensions are generous, individuals in general hold less savings.  
 In this paper, we present new evidence on the displacement effect of public 
pensions by using cross-country variation in the generosity and progressivity of pensions. 
We use micro-datasets from many more countries than those considered in Kapteyn and 
Panis (2005) to construct income replacement rate and private saving measures by 
education level and marital status, which are good proxies for lifetime earnings. Our 
identification strategy exploits within-country differences in replacement rates and 
accumulated financial assets at the time of retirement. We estimate reduced-form models 
derived from a standard life-cycle model in order to quantify the displacement effect. We 
find evidence of a displacement effect of public pensions on accumulated financial assets 
ranging from 23 to 44 cent for every additional dollar of public pension wealth. We also 
report a substancial income effect of pension wealth on the retirement age. 
 The paper is organized as follows. We first present within a simple theoretical 
model the factors that affect the displacement and early retirement effect and derive 
estimable equations that can be used to assess the size of such effects on private savings. 
We then discuss in Section 3 our empirical strategy. Section 4 reports the results while 
we conclude in Section 5. 
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2. Theoretical Model 
Assume an individual who is making decisions from time t = 0  to T , regarding 
consumption  and work. We assume the work decisions are lumped together such that 
individuals work from period  to some time 
 ct
t = 0 t = R  at which point they retire. For 
simplicity we assume individuals get constant income  while working. Our setup is 
closest to Gale (1998) and Laitner and Silverman (2007). 
yt = y
The public pension once retired is given by . The term  bt (R) = α(R)φ( y) α(R)  is an 
actuarial factor which adjusts the pension to the retirement (claiming) age and  φ( y) is the 
benefit that would be received at normal retirement age. For example, in the United 
States it is the primary insurance amount (PIA). In most countries, the earnings-related 
part of the pension function is progressive such that φ '(Y ) < 1, and α '(R) > 0  such that 
later retirement is rewarded by higher benefits. Assuming an interest rate,  r , the present 
value of pension benefits upon retirement is given by  
 
 
B(R) = α(R)φ(y) e−rt dt
0
T −R
∫ = α(R)φ(y)ξ(R) . 
The present value of benefits at retirement is actuarially fair (does not depend on R) if 
 α(R)ξ(R) = k  where  k  is a scaling parameter. In that case, pension wealth at the time of 
retirement is
 
. B(R) = y) = f
k
(y)kf (
Now assume the individual derives utility from consumption prior to retirement given 
by 




,γ > 0  
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and after retirement  . The parameter v(ct ) = u(ct ) + Γ γ  captures the curvature of the 
utility function. Our formulation of the utility function implies that consumption and 
leisure are strongly separable. This simplifies the exposition without altering the main 
mechanisms. Finally, assume the individual has a discount rate ρ .  
Assuming the individual starts with zero assets, =0 and has to die with non-
negative assets,  , he solves the following optimization problem 
a0
aT ≥ 0
 . (1) 
 




∫ +ψ (aR + B(R), R)
s.t.
&at = rat + yt − ct ,a0 = 0
The post-retirement indirect utility ψ  in turn is given by solving the maximization 
problem  
  (2) 
 





&at = rat − ct
aR = A+ B(R),aT ≥ 0
The solution for consumption, given the retirement age, can be directly derived from 








= η,   c0 = δ[Y (R) + e
−rR B(R)] (3) 
where . Assuming 
 
δ = λ / (eλT −1),  λ = η − r,  Y (R) = y e−rs
0
R
∫ ds r = ρ  to focus on 
pension-induced savings, we see that consumption is constant over the life-cycle: in each 
period the individual consumes a constant fraction of his life-time income. In that case, 
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the fraction does not depend on preferences. But life-time income may depend on 
preferences as it is affected by the choice of the retirement age.  
The first-order condition for the timing of retirement takes the form 
 
  (4) cR
−γ [y + B '(R)] = Γ
where  ′B  denotes the derivative with respect to R .  The left-hand side represents the 
marginal benefit from delayed retirement (additional income converted into utility using 
the marginal utility of consumption) and the right-hand side represents the marginal cost 
of leisure foregone by retiring later.  
Substituting optimal consumption and taking logs we get 
 
  (5)  log[y + B '(R)]− γ log[Y (R) + e
−rR B(R)] = logΓ − log[δ *]
where  . This equation implicitly defines the retirement age. The first term 
captures the “accrual” effect of postponing retirement: more income directly from 
earnings, and the accrual in the present value of pension benefits.  Gruber and Wise 
(1999) document this term and find that in most countries there is a penalty to continuing 
work (i.e. B’(R)<0). The second term on the right-hand side captures the income effect. 
The income effect increases with the concavity of the utility function.  
δ * = δ −γ
A closed-form solution to  R  will generally not be possible. Differentiation of (5) 
with respect to φ , which amounts to an increase in the generosity of the pension system, 
shows that increasing generosity will reduce the retirement age provided B’(R) is either 
small or negative as is the case in many countries. 
The effect of changing the replacement rate on the consumption path can be found 
analogously. Let 
 
















]  (6) 
The first term within the brackets represents the displacement effect. The individual can 
consume the marginal increase in his retirement benefit (discounted) and spread it over 
the entire life-cycle. Hence savings decrease. However, there is a second effect due to 
induced earlier retirement. If the income effect is large, the individual will retire earlier 
which leads to a drop in lifetime income. This is financed by an increase in savings 
during the working life. The net effect of increasing the replacement rate on savings is 
therefore unclear and depends on preferences as well as the extent to which pensions 
replace earnings. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
To derive testable implications it is first useful to rewrite the solution in terms of assets. 





= yp(r,R) - c
0
p(l ,R)  (7) 
where 
 
p(s,t) = est e- st - 1
- s





= (1 - q(l ,R))yp(r,R) - q(l ,R)e- rRf
k




q(l ,t) = e
l t - 1
e l T - 1
.  Equation (8) implies that, provided one knows  , regressing 
assets on adjusted pension wealth should yield a coefficient of negative one, i.e. perfect 
displacement. Gale (1998) shows that omitting the adjustment factor 
l
  affects the 
estimate of the displacement effect. Since 
q(l ,R)
 q(l ,R)  is between zero and one, using 
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uncorrected pension wealth leads to an attenuation bias towards zero. Even if the true 
displacement effect is not one, for example due to capital market imperfections, Gale 
shows that adjustment is still necessary in order to interpret correctly the offset effect. 
Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) make a similar point when looking at the effect of 
pension reform on savings. With a discount factor of 3%, life expectancy of 80, start age 
of 20, retirement age of 60, this factor  q  is 0.93. Obviously it is larger at younger ages t. 
An alternative specification involves dividing both sides of (8) by earnings, yielding a 
simple bivariate relationship 








= a(l ,  (9) 
r,R)
The left hand-side is the ratio of assets to lifetime earnings. The right hand side is the 
adjusted ratio of pension wealth to lifetime earnings.  
First assume we have access to cross-sectional data at the time of retirement 
where we observe 
 



















 assuming  r = r  so that  l = - r . Then the 
following regression  










,  i = 1,...,N
1
RE
should yield a coefficient estimate of 
 
a = - 1
1
 if the model is correctly specified and 
 l = - r . In practice, studies focusing on cross-sectional variation within a country 




 but not in  f (). The covariation in  zi  is 
problematic if there is for example unobserved heterogeneity in tastes for leisure and 
consumption.  An alternative source of identification is available if data from multiple 
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countries are available. In that case variation across countries in  REP  could help 
identify 
 
















,  c = 1,...,C  (11) 
This strategy deals with unobserved heterogeneity across individuals; other-country 
differences might explain the cross-country differences in replacement rate and asset-to-
income ratio.  
Another possibility is to pool cross-sectional observations across countries. This 
strategy exploits similarities across individuals in different countries in terms of tastes, 
leisure, and economic opportunities. One possibility is to group individuals by education 




















,i = 1,...,N ,c C= 1...,  (12) 
where both group and country fixed effects are included. The key identifying assumption 
is that differences in unobserved tastes across groups are the same across countries. 
Assuming that  k,R  are the same across countries, the key source of variation in 
replacement rates is given by deviation in  f (y)/y  from their country mean and group 
means. If replacement rates do not depend on earnings, there will be no variation in 
replacement rates in response to deviation from their country or group means. Hence, 
progressivity is crucial. 
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 Estimation of the asset equation above effectively controls for the retirement age 
since we substituted the solution for optimal consumption conditional on the retirement 
age.  In that sense it allows us to estimate the partial displacement effect. However, the 
net effect depends on the magnitude of the income effect of pensions on retirement age. 
We also estimate the income effect by following a similar retirement strategy. In 

















,i = 1,...,N,c = 1,...,C  (13) 
where 
 
RE  is the average retirement age for cell (i,c) and  T
i,c  











 is a mix of income and substitution effect, in particular when estimated using 
ex-post social security wealth. If social security wealth depends on the retirement age (
b
1
 k  




 should be biased upwards.  
 
3.1. Data Sources 
We use data from a combination of micro-data sources to implement our empirical 
strategy. To merge these data sources together, we aggregated data by cells defined by 
education level and marital status (defining observations i). We used three education 
categories as defined by the ISCED classification (primary, secondary, and tertiary) and 
two marital status categories (married/partner, single). The rationale for using those 
characteristics is that education level and marital status are powerful measures of lifetime 
earnings. Variation in lifetime earnings ultimately allow us to exploit cross-country 
differences in the progressivity of pension formulas. Furthermore, we use net rather than 
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gross measures because additional variation is created through differences in the 
progressivity of the income tax function across countries. 
We aggregate data on assets and retirement ages from aging surveys in 12 
countries covering the age 50+ population: the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) and the Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which cover 10 continental European countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden). 
We use data collected in the 2004 wave of each survey (wave 7 of HRS, wave 2 of 
ELSA, and wave 1 of SHARE). The sample includes retired males aged 65 to 75. By that 










, comparable across 
countries. The data appendix gives details on the construction of the variable. Financial 
assets such as savings, stocks, and retirement accounts are relatively liquid and one 
would expect the displacement effect to operate for those in particular. Other assets, most 
notably housing, are much less liquid, and participation in the housing market likely 
differs across countries and groups for reasons other than the generosity of pensions. 
Some studies have argued against using narrow definitions of wealth in cross-sectional 
regressions (e.g. Gale, 1998). They find larger effects with more inclusive measures. 
However, it is not clear why estimates are larger with more inclusive measures. It 
depends on whether different types of assets have different degree of substitutability with 
pension wealth. We constructed the retirement age,  R , using self-reports from HRS, 
ELSA, and SHARE. For SHARE, no direct question asked about the retirement age, but a 
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question asks about the date when the last job ended. We used this question to construct 
the retirement age. 
The aging surveys we use have limited measures of lifetime earnings. Hence, we 
constructed pre-retirement net earnings from longitudinal surveys in the same set of 
countries. For the U.S., we used the 1994 to 1997 Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), while for European countries, we use the 1994 to 1997 waves of the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) for European countries. We used net individual 
and household earnings and top-coded the 99th percentile of each cell. The ECHP asks 
directly for net household and individual annual earnings. The PSID asks only about 
gross household and individual annual earnings. We used the OECD tax calculator to 
compute net earnings. We used average earnings from age 25 to 55 as a measure of 
permanent earnings,  y . We constructed the lifetime measure of earnings using an interest 
rate of 0.03, a start age of 20, and the average retirement age within each cell. 
Aging surveys ask retired individuals about their current gross pension benefits. 
However, in some countries benefits are more often cashed out rather than annuitized, 
and it is not clear how to compute net benefits from the gross amount reported. Instead, 
we used data from the OECD on net replacement rates as a function of relative net 
average lifetime earnings. The OECD calculates these net replacement rates, defined as 
net benefit divided by net average lifetime earnings. We obtained a complete mapping for 
each country. These replacement rates are calculated on an individual basis and do not 
include spouse benefits. We used net earnings computed from the ECHP and PSID to 
map a replacement rate to each spouse and compute household net pension benefits, 
 f (y) .  
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We computed pension wealth assuming a discount factor of 3% and using country 
and gender specific survival probabilities. We used mortality rates from the Human 
Mortality Database for the year 2004 (www.mortality.org). This formed our estimate of 
 k . Pension wealth was then defined as  SSW = kf (y) .  The factor  q(- r,R)  was 
estimated using the average retirement age in each cell, a discount rate of 3% and  T  
equal to life expectancy as of age 20 (roughly 56-60 years). The estimated factor ranges 
from 0.91 to 0.96.  The remaining variables  A  and  REP  were constructed by dividing 
each quantities by lifetime earnings. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics by country on the 
main variables used to derive  A  and  REP . 
 We use the number of observations in each cell to weight observations in the 
regressions. This was done to reflect the uncertainty in the cell estimates for those with 
few observations. We discard cells with fewer than 5 observations. The point estimates 
were generally robust to the cut-off used but slightly more dependent on whether we 
weighted or not. The HRS and ELSA have much larger samples than other surveys, 
which tended to increase the influence of these cells relative to smaller cells representing 
some European countries (particularly among the highly educated and the unmarried).  
The results were however robust to scaling U.S. and England counts back to the average 
cell size among other European countries. 
4. Results 
We first present evidence that OECD net replacement rates reveal substantial differences 
in progressivity. In Figure 1 we present net replacement rates, defined as net pension 
benefits divided by annual net earnings  f (y)/y , as a function of relative annual earnings 
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 y  for 12 OECD countries (OECD Pension at a Glance, 2005). In general, replacement 
rates decline with earnings, reflecting progressivity but the degree of progressivity is also 
quite different across countries.  This is crucial to the identification strategy in equation 
(9). 
4.1. Assets 
We estimate three different regressions of  A  and  REP . First, we aggregate up at the 
country level and perform a country-level regression. This is quite similar to the cross-
country regressions done by Feldstein (1977, 1978) although it uses age-group-specific 
asset (those age 65-75) and earnings information (from age 25-55 in 1994). Figure 2 plots 
the estimates of  A  and  REP  for each country in the analysis along with a regression 
line. A negative relationship is clearly visible and the regression estimate reported in 




= - 0.245  [t=1.85]. Using a similar 
strategy, Feldstein (1977) reports an estimate of -0.37 which is fairly close given the 
uncertainty in regressions with 12 observations. 
 We then estimate a pooled regression where we include education and marital 
status fixed effects but no country fixed effects. This is more akin to empirical 
specifications using cross-sectional variation in earnings although it also uses variation in 
replacement rates across countries. Column 2 of Table 2 reports the results. The estimate 
is now 
 
 [t=2.88]. Hence, the estimate is fairly robust to using the cross-
country vs. cross-sectional variation. However, both these strategies make important 
assumptions about the presence of unobserved differences across countries and groups. 





fixed effects. These estimates rely primarly on differences in the progressivity of the 




= - 0.44  [t=2.16]. For each dollar increase in pension wealth, this estimate suggests 
that financial wealth decreases by roughly 44 cents. This is substantially larger than the 
estimates in the first two columns of Table 2. In Figure 3, we check whether the effect 
identified is due to any particular outlier. To accomplish this we first regress both left-
hand side (asset to income ratio) and right-hand side (replacement rate) on country and 
cell specific fixed effects. We then take the residuals from those regressions. Due to 
properties of least-squares, regressing the asset residual on the replacement rate residual 




. We plot those residuals in Figure 3 along with the 
regression line. We also include an indication of the size of each cell. The larger the 
“bubble” around a cell, the larger is the number of observations used in the cell. One can 
see that the results are not driven by any particular observations. Rather, there is a very 
clear negative relationship between these residuals. Overall, using different identification 
strategies, we estimate an effect ranging from -23 to -44 cents per additional dollar of 
pension wealth.  
4.2. Retirement Age 
In Table 3, we present regression results for the effect of pension wealth on retirement. 
The first column uses country-level observations as in Table 2. The point estimate is -
-0.006 but fairly imprecisely estimated (t=0.6). In the second column, we pool cells from 
all countries and obtain a similar estimate, -0.007 but now statistically significant at the 
5% level (t=2.05). Finally, the last column of Table 3 reports estimates with country and 
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group fixed effects. The estimate is somewhat larger (-0.011) and still precisely estimated 
(t=-3.24).  Figure 4 shows that this is not due to any particular outlier. This suggests a 
substantially large income effect. For a ten thousand dollar change in pension wealth, the 
retirement age decreases by roughly one month. Take two countries with vastly different 
generosity of public pensions, the Netherlands and England. Our estimate of mean 
pension wealth in the Netherlands is $317.6 thousand while it is $222.2 thousand in 
England. The Dutch retire earlier than their British counterparts: the average retirement 
age is 59.1 in the Netherlands compared to 61.2 in England. The effect from the third 
specification in Table 3 yields a predicted difference of 1.06 years while the actual 
difference in 2.1 years. Hence, this would explain 50% of the gap in the retirement age 




This paper provides novel evidence on the displacement and early retirement effects of 
public pensions using both cross-country and within-country variation in the generosity 
of public pensions. Earlier evidence either relied on within-country variation across 
individuals or over time, or on aggregate cross-country data. Our estimates suggest a 
displacement effect of roughly -25 to -45 cents of financial assets for every additional 
dollar of pension wealth and an early retirement effect of approximately 1 month for 
every additional $10,000 in pension wealth. These estimates provide new evidence which 
confirms that public pensions likely depress asset accumulation, although by less than 
what the standard life cycle theory predicts. There are many reasons why this offset is 
15
imperfect but little research has examined those in detail. One interesting avenue for 
further research is to exploit other institutional differences across countries, such as the 
degree of borrowing constraints and labor market regulations, to enrich our understanding 
of the reasons behind the imperfect displacement effect. Our modeling of retirement and 
saving decisions was simple for reasons of tractability and because of data limitations. 
But with additional waves of aging surveys, and retrospective life histories, one important 
avenue for further research is to enrich structural models of life cycle decision making 
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Our analytic dataset is derived from a number of sources. Our Household Wealth 
measures are derived from “aging” surveys: Wave 1 (2004) of the Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement (SHARE), Wave 2 (2004-2005) of the English Longitudinal 
Study of Ageing (ELSA), and Wave 7 (2004) of the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS). Our Household Pre-Retirement Net Earnings measure is derived from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) (1994-1997) and the Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) (1994-1997). Our pension information comes from 
replacement rate calculations as a function of net pre-retirement earnings made available 
to us by OECD. Finally, we use the 2004 period life tables for males from the Human 




We define cells for each country by marital status (defined as married/partnered or 
single) and three education level (primary, secondary, tertiary) following the ISCED 
classification. The definition of these variables is comparable across the various datasets 
we used. We select men aged 65-75 and not working in the aging surveys and select men 




Our Financial Wealth variable includes bank account balances, the values of stocks and 
bonds, and money saved in individual retirement accounts. Values are expressed in 2004 
dollars and are adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity using OECD comparative price 
levels. We compute the median wealth within each country-education-marital status cell. 
The original variables used are as follows: 
 
  
HRS ELSA SHARE 
Bank Accounts HQ344-HQ348 IASAVA HBACCV 
Stocks JQ316-JQ320 IASS, IAUIT HSTOCV, HMUTFV 
Bonds JQ330-JQ334, JQ356-JQ360 IANPB, IANS, IABG HBONDV 
IRAs JQ162,         JQ165_1 - JQ169_3
IASISA, IATI, 
IACISA, IAIP HIRAV 
 
Pre-Retirement Net Earnings 
 
Our Pre-Retirement Net Earnings variable is derived from earnings data from four waves 
of ECHP and PSID, 1994 - 1997. Values are expressed in 2004 dollars, PPP-adjusted, 
using OECD wage growth data and PPP-adjusted exchange rates. The variable is a mean 
value for net earnings within each country-education-marital status cell. The sample 
18
consists of households (single and married couples) headed by a male aged 25-55. 
Individuals with missing data on education, marital status, or work status were dropped. 
Earnings were topcoded at the 99th percentile within each country. Gross earnings data 
for the United States from PSID was converted into net earnings using the OECD tax 
calculator. 
 
Public Pension Net Benefits 
 
Our Public Pension Net Earnings Replacement Rate variable is derived using 
replacement rates calculated by the OECD. The OECD analysis maps levels of pre-
retirement earnings (expressed as a multiple of the earnings of a representative worker) to 
the replacement rate provided by each country’s mandatory public pension system.2 
OECD has been publishing data using their current definition of representative 
worker earnings since 20003. We converted cell level mean earnings from ECHP and 
PSID into 2000-level national currency using OECD wage growth data. This was then 
converted into a multiple of representative worker earnings using OECD earnings data. 
The OECD mapping from earnings to replacement rate was then used to calculate 
the household replacement rate directly for unmarried men. For married men, additional 
steps were necessary, as the OECD mapping is given only with regards to individuals. 
We calculated individual replacement rates for the husband and wife separately, 
converted them into the implied individual benefits, added them together to get total 
household benefits, and divided the result by total household earnings to get a household 
earnings replacement rate. This does not include “spouse” benefits which are common in 
some countries. 
 
Assumptions Regarding Mortality and Discounting 
 
We compute the present value of pension benefits using the males’ survival rates derived 
from the Human Mortality database and assuming a discount rate of 3%. We discounted 
back to the average age at interview within each cell. Other present values assumed a 
discount factor of 3% as well.  
 
                                                 
2 This analysis is used in the OECD’s “Pensions at a Glance” series; we received access to tables relating 
income to replacement rates with increments of 0.1*representative-worker-income. 
3 Reflecting the changing balance of economic sectors, the definition of representative worker now includes 
the full-time service workers in addition to the traditional full-time production workers 
19
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Notes: OECD net replacement rates as a function of multiple of average earnings 
as reported in the OECD publication “Pension at a Glance”. Net replacement rate 




Figure 2 Country Level Relationship between Lifetime Replacement Rate 
and the Ratio of Financial Wealth to Lifetime Earnings 
 
Notes: AU Austria, BE Belgium, DE Germany, DK Denmark, EN England, FR France, GR Greece, IT Italy, 
NL Netherlands, SP Spain, SE Sweden, US United States. The solid line represents a regression line from 
regressing the ratio of financial wealth to lifetime earnings (A) on the lifetime replacement rate (REP).
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Figure 3 Relationship between Replacement Rate and the Ratio of Financial 
Wealth to Earnings: After Controlling for Group Differences 
 
 
Notes: Each dot in the figure represents a cell’s partial residuals for the ratio of financial wealth/ life time 
earnings and the net replacement rate as calculated using the formula in the text. The residuals are 
computed by regressing each variable on a set of indicators for education, household type, and country. The 
size of the “bubble” around each dot is proportional to the size of the cell (in terms of observations). The 
solid line denotes the regression line from regressing the financial wealth ratio residual on that for the 
replacement rate. Its slope is equal to the point estimate reported in column 3 of Table 2 by construction. 
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Figure 4 Relationship between Pension Wealth and Average Retirement 
Age: After Controlling for Group Differences 
 
 
Notes: Each dot in the figure represents a cell’s partial residuals for average retirement age and pension 
wealth. The residuals are computed by regressing each variable on a set of indicators for education, 
household type, and country and household pre-retirement net earnings. The size of the “bubble” around 
each dot is proportional to the size of the cell (in terms of observations). The solid line denotes the 
regression line from regressing the average retirement age residual on that for pension wealth. Its slope is 
equal to the point estimate reported in column 3 of Table 3 by construction. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics by Country 
Country Primary Secondary Tertiary
Austria 23.5 53.9 22.6 80.7 10541 91 39889 59.13
Belgium 56.3 21.3 22.4 82.9 20241 66 32021 58.64
Denmark 18.9 52.7 28.4 72.3 43420 90 35727 61.39
England 56.5 32.4 11.1 77.7 21194 57 39478 61.22
France 55.7 27.1 17.2 83.3 24565 65 36571 58.37
Germany 6.6 65.2 28.3 86.9 12963 57 37208 60.46
Greece 72.5 15.5 12.0 85.8 4225 112 21889 60.87
Italy 86.7 10.5 2.7 92.9 8768 79 20365 58.77
Netherlands 56.0 28.2 15.8 90.1 15415 99 30420 59.17
Spain 90.9 4.3 4.7 86.6 5694 82 18609 61.64
Sweden 65.2 20.9 14.0 88.9 29809 71 29875 62.20

















Notes: The sample consists of retired men aged 65-75 in 2004, from Wave 1 of SHARE, Wave 2 of ELSA, 
and Wave 7 of HRS. Average net household earnings (pre-retirement) was calculated using a pooled 
sample of working men aged 50-55, using the 1994-1997 waves of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) and Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). Sample weights used. Gross income 
measures in PSID were converted to net income using the OECD tax calculator. Education levels are based 
on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997): Primary = ISCED 0,1 ; Secondary = 
ISCED 2,3; Tertiary = ISCED 4,5,6. The average retirement age does not include those not yet retired. 
Financial wealth includes bank account balances, the value of stocks and bonds, and money saved in 
individual retirement accounts. All monetary figures are 2004 dollars, PPP-adjusted. 
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Table 2 Regression Results –Replacement Rate 
   
4 64
Model (1) (2) (3)
Replacement Rate -0.245 -0.228 -0.441
1.85 2.88 2.16
Fixed Effects
Country No No Yes
Education & Household Size No Yes Yes
N 12 6
R-sq 0.182 0.654 0.787
 
 
Notes: Results are from regression of the ratio between median financial wealth and mean 
household earnings on the net replacement rate provided by mandatory public pensions. The first 
regression uses country-level aggregated measures. The second uses disaggregated data and fixed 
effects for each education*marital status combination. Education has three categories based on the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997): Primary (ISCED 0,1), Secondary 
(ISCED 2,3) and Tertiary (ISCED 4,5,6). Marital status is dichotomous for currently married or not 
currently married. The last specification includes both group and country fixed effects. Replacement 
rates are calculated using pension data from OECD and pre-retirement mean household earnings. 
Pre-retirement mean household earnings is derived from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) and the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). The sample consists of retired 
men aged 65-75 in 2004, from Wave 1 of SHARE, Wave 2 of ELSA, and Wave 7 of HRS. Absolute t 
statistics are below the parameter estimates. Regressions use cell counts (number of observations) 







Table 3 Regression Results – Retirement Age 
 
 
Model (1) (2) (3)
Pension Wealth (in thousands) -0.006 -0.007 -0.011
0.68 2.05 3.24
Fixed effect controls
Country No No Yes
Education and household type No Yes Yes
N 12 64 6
R-sq 0.071 0.298 0.915
 
Notes: Results are from regression of the average retirement age on the pension wealth provided 
by mandatory public pensions. The first regression uses country-level aggregated measures. The 
second uses disaggregated data and fixed effects for each education*marital status combination. 
Education has three categories based on the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED 1997): Primary (ISCED 0,1), Secondary (ISCED 2,3) and Tertiary (ISCED 4,5,6). Marital 
status is dichotomous for currently married or not currently married. The last specification includes 
both group and country fixed effects. Pension wealth is calculated using pension data from OECD 
and pre-retirement mean household earnings. Pre-retirement mean household earnings is derived 
from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the Panel Survey of Income 
Dynamics (PSID). The sample consists of retired men aged 65-75 in 2004, from Wave 1 of SHARE, 
Wave 2 of ELSA, and Wave 7 of HRS. Absolute t statistics are below the parameter estimates. 
Regressions use cell counts (number of observations) as weights. Cells with fewer than 5 
observations are discarded (8 cells). 
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